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This paper explores the significance of Islamic banking in Malaysia for stability in the 
country’s economy as a whole. Neither conventional theory nor Islamic economics puts 
forward a systematic explanation of financial intermediation; consequently, neither is 
capable of identifying destabilizing elements in the system. Instead, a flow- of-funds 
approach similar to Minsky’s own is applied to the (post-) modern consumption-led) 
business cycle and financial (and asset) market. 
Malaysia’s structural current account surplus contributes to the overcapitalization of 
domestic firms. This in turn finances a financial (as opposed to an industrial), consumption-
led (instead of investment-led) business cycle, where banking favors destabilizing asset price 
inflation. Islamic banks operating interdependently with conventional ones contribute to 
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    2I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Islamic banking is perceived to be at its “tipping point” turning from a niche market 
phenomenon into a mainstream product (BBC 2005, 2006, Credit Suisse 2006). Although 
the total international assets of Islamic banks — estimated at 0.5% of the world’s banking 
assets (The Economist 2008) — are still marginal, growth rates are phenomenal especially in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 
Yet, Islamic banking still seems incomprehensible to Western economists. As 
discussed in section 2 due to the prohibition of interest and collateral, Islamic banking is 
hardly reconcilable with Western economic theory dominated by the asymmetric 
information paradigm. Islamic scholars, however, claim that it is superior to conventional 
banking due to (1) the morality of the homo Islamicus surmounting moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems, (2) the developmental character promoting growth and wealth 
redistribution and most importantly, (3) the inherent stability of Islamic banking in reducing 
economic fluctuations and reoccurring crisis. Section 3 shows that these claims are 
questionable.  
This paper explores the significance of Islamic banking in Malaysia for stability of 
the domestic economy as a whole. Neither conventional theory nor Islamic economics — 
which surprisingly do not differ significantly in their methodological approach — offers a 
suitable methodology. Both fail to put forward a systematic explanation of financial 
intermediation and are consequently incapable in identifying destabilizing elements in the 
system.  
Section 4 shows that Malaysia’s structural current account surplus causes the over-
capitalization of domestic firms. This in turn results in the emergence of a financial (as 
opposed to an industrial), consumption-led (instead of investment-led) business cycle where 
banking favors destabilizing asset price inflation. Islamic banks operating inter-dependently 
with conventional ones contribute to economic destabilization channeling surplus funds from 
the corporate to the household sector, feeding asset inflation. 
The paper’s application of financialization and excess capitalization to the Malaysian 
economy is groundbreaking since it extends both theories — originally developed for 
advanced economies — to emerging markets. Thereby, it exposes key links between asset 
inflation and the banking system under special consideration of Islamic banks. The paper 
reveals the hitherto undiscussed dynamic interaction between the Islamic and the non-
Islamic economy in Malaysia. It shows how Islamic banking contributes to asset inflation in 
the economy. Due to Malaysia’s international integration, this interaction is paramount since 
    3the country is a paradigm of the financial structures into which Islamic banking is emerging 
globally. In this way, the paper contributes toward the understanding of Islamic banking as a 
financial phenomenon providing a systemic account — incorporating a macroeconomic as 
well as a microeconomic analysis — of its functioning and economic significance.  
 
II. ISLAMIC BANKING IN CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
Banks are understood in a generic sense as financial intermediaries. Their main task is to 
provide indirect finance — in contrast to direct finance through financial markets. 
Households, business firms, the government and foreigners can in principle possess a surplus 
or a deficit in funds and consequently supply or demand credit. However, households are 
identified as most important “lender-savers” while businesses and the government are the 
major “borrower-spenders” (Mishkin and Eakins 2006; 18). Typically, economic analysis 
deals initially with a simplified setting of a closed economy without government and only 
subsequently loosens these restrictions. Banks are understood to channel surplus funds from 
the household sector into the corporate sector facing a deficit, as it invests more than internal 
or direct finance would allow for. Hence, banks play a vital role in the economy enabling 
more productive investment than would be possible merely on the basis of profits and 
financial market funds. So far Western and Islamic understandings of banking do not differ 
significantly.
1 Major differences become apparent examining the rationale, explaining why 
financial intermediaries exist.  
An asymmetric information understanding of the functioning of banks must lead to 
the conclusion that Islamic banks are not viable. The distinguishing features of these banks 
are the prohibition of charging or paying interest, the impermissibility of demanding 
collateral and, to a small extent, compulsory charitable spending (Khan and Mirakhor 1992; 
Dhumale and Sapcanin 2004). This does not mean that Islamic banks are constrained to be 
non-profit organizations. Profit merely has to be generated by primary and secondary modes 
of Islamic finance (Chapra 2000a). Primary modes include profit-sharing arrangements such 
as mudharabah (partnership) and musyarakah (equity participation).
2  
                                                 
1 Consensus in Islamic economics regards banks as financial intermediaries, mobilizing savings from the public 
and making advances to entrepreneurs (Siddiqi 1981). 
2 Three partners can be identified in an Islamic finance contract: the depositor, the bank and the borrower. 
Concerning the supply of savings and capital, there is the depositor entering either into a not remunerated 
safeguarding agreement or into a remunerated partnership agreement with the bank. While the bank is not 
obliged to share profits with holders of current or savings deposits it must encash these deposits on demand. 
Investment and special investment accounts are entitled to a share in profit but typically demand a long-term 
commitment and also a share in losses. 
    4Concerning the demand for finance, the entrepreneur receiving credit is only liable as 
to her time and effort invested. The profit (or loss) is shared at a predetermined ratio between 
the bank and the entrepreneur. While in the case of mudharabah projects the bank does not 
possess any direct influence on the investment a musyarakah arrangement entitles it to rights 
of the type a joint venture partner possesses (Chapra 2000a; Dhumale and Sapcanin 2004; 
Van Greuning and Iqbal 2008). Secondary financing modes are meant to take a subordinate 
position since they are essentially mark-up pricing or leasing arrangements, and in that sense 
not “truly Islamic“ because there is less emphasis on the productive element of the 
investment (Sundararajan and Errico 2002; 18; Chapra 2000a). As to the supply side of 
funds, depositors can choose to put their savings into demand deposits, which are held by the 
bank possibly against a fee without yielding any return, or into mudharabah deposits, which 
generate a profit depending on the bank’s financing (Van Greuning and Iqbal 2008). 
It is the prohibition of interest combined with the common belief that banks channel 
funds towards productive investment, which makes Islamic banking and Western economic 
theory inconsistent with each other. The supply price of credit disappears in a profit-and-loss 
sharing (PLS) framework because the absolute profit is not known to the bank until the 
investment is realized. A predetermined return to the lender, dependent on the borrowing 
period and independent of the borrower’s uncertainty, is not permissible under Islamic 
banking.
3 Hence, primary modes of Islamic banking are incomprehensible for Western 
economists using models with a supply price for credit. This might explain why there is little 
genuine Western theory applied and developed. Alternatively, many attempts exist to make 
Islamic banking resemble conventional banking schemes. This includes the claim that the 
majority of Islamic lending has a debt-like character (Aggarwal and Youssef 1996).
4 The 
above theoretical conception of banking and the phenomenon of Islamic banking are very 
much reconcilable for secondary modes of Islamic finance resulting in predetermined debt 
servicing, which in fact constitute the majority of Islamic banking transactions and in 
Malaysia almost their totality (table 2.1). 
 
 
                                                 
3 Mostly, it is genuine uncertainty that the entrepreneur faces since an investment project – especially 
greenfield investment – entails too many unknowns to generate probabilities for all possible outcomes and in 
that way to turn it into quantifiable risk.  
4 This observation makes Islamic banking fit nicely into the New Keynesian paradigm again. Given the 
uncertainty of PLS arrangement and asymmetry of information, it is arguably rational for Islamic banks to use 
debt-like instruments in order to reduce moral hazard and the destabilizing effect of an uncertain interest rate. 
Such reasoning reveals that the New Keynesian approach is firmly rooted in the GE framework.  
    5Table 2.1: The Islamic Banking System in Malaysia — Major Financing Concepts as % 
of Total Islamic lending 
 
Year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Primary Modes of Finance  
(Mudharabah & Musyarakah)  1.40%  0.70%  0.50%  0.50%  0.30% 
Other Islamic Concepts 
(Bai' Bithaman Ajil, Ijarah, 
Ijarah Thumma Al-Bai', Istisna', 
Murabahah & other Islamic 
Concepts) 98.60% 99.30% 99.50%  99.50%  99.70% 
Source: BNM, Annual Reports, 2001-2005. 
 
 
III. ISLAMIC BANKING IN ISLAMIC ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
As far as Islamic scholars are concerned Islamic banks should engage primarily in PLS 
activities (Chapra 2000a; Siddiqi 1981, 1983). They, but also an increasing number of 
Western economists, regard Islamic banking to be superior to conventional banking. This 
superiority manifests itself in three aspects:  
(1) The morality of the homo Islamicus. Despite some dissent expressed
5 the 
abolition of interest from all financial transactions in Islamic finance constitutes the 
orthodox and consensual view of Islamic scholars (Khan 1985; Chapra 2000a). The rationale 
behind this prohibition does not need to be questioned from an Islamic perspective, since it 
is demanded by the Qur’an. The absence of interest constitutes the moral dimension of 
Islamic economics (Chapra 2006). Morality is inherent to the homo Islamicus whose values 
do not tolerate the injustice of charging interest. Injustice in the case of interest on 
consumption credit results from the exploitation of the needy and on production credit from 
the absence of sharing the uncertainty embodied in every enterprise. Obviously, Islamic 
economic teaching adheres to the idea of “natural law” providing a society that is just and 
unexploitative. “Natural law”, however, implies the universal nature of humanity, society, 
and economy excluding the possibility of their evolutionary development.  
(2) The developmental character of the Islamic economic system. The developmental 
dimension of Islamic economics does not merely center on high or optimum growth rates but 
explicitly refers to social welfare including need fulfillment and full employment (Chapra 
                                                 
5 See for example El-Gamal (2006). 
    62006; Lewis and Algaoud 2001). This dimension also possesses an aspect of justice because 
the notion of development embraces a (more) equitable wealth distribution. Zakat, an 
Islamic compulsory contribution towards charity, and Muslim inheritance law are the main 
instruments of redistribution (Khan 1968). Yet, zakat is typically fixed at a level of 
approximately 2.5% of unused savings, which justifies severe doubts as to its redistributive 
nature (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). As it is not mandatory for invested funds zakat might 
exert an inflationary effect on commodity or capital markets because it penalizes investors’ 
liquidity preference, favoring funds inflow into assets perceived as highly liquid such as 
sukuk, Islamic bonds. This observation raises stability issues. 
(3) Increased stability. Financial and economic stability is perceived to be an original 
feature of the Islamic economic system conceptually ensured by morality, development and 
a relatively equitable wealth distribution and practically by the abolition of interest and 
promotion of wealth redistribution in accordance with divine law.  
These three dimensions simultaneously reflect the objectives and the characteristics 
of the Islamic financial system. In the following, this study focuses on the theoretical 
consequences for the banking sector of these dimensions.  
 
III.1. The Moral Dimension Of Islamic Economics 
Interestingly, the Islamic economy in its ideal state does not differ from an Arrow-Debreu 
economy (Arrow and Debreu 1954) concerning lending and borrowing. The information and 
incentive alignment problems that New Keynesians stress are addressed referring to 
behavioral norms.
6 Leading Islamic economists mainly criticize the concept of the homo 
economicus in neoclassical economics. The moral dimension of Islamic economics is 
regarded to be the discipline’s raison d’être (Siddiqi 2000; Chapra 2000b). In the ideal 
Muslim community collateral would not be needed since religious norms prevent moral 
hazard problems from arising. Equally, the existence of asymmetric information would not 
be relevant since trust among borrowers and lenders would align borrowers’ and lenders’ 
interests through PLS perceived to be fair by both sides. Consequently, the economy of 
perfect competition, information and market clearing is a parallel world to the perfect 
Muslim community (Dar and Presley 1999). In both worlds, neither a premium for external 
                                                 
6 Such reasoning is in fact not unique to Islamic thought as Max Weber’s work on the Protestant ethic 
demonstrates. Weber argued that in modern Europe Protestants – as opposed to Catholics – own an over—
proportional share of capital since their religious values call for diligence and fulfilment of obligations in their 
worldly and especially professional life (Weber 1969).  
    7finance nor collateral is necessary to reach the socially optimal level of lending and 
borrowing.  
However, the assumption that credit supply is infinitely elastic — reflected in the 
horizontal credit supply curve — is questionable in models where Islamic banks are required 
to hold 100% reserves for demand deposits.
 7 Here, only funds held in investment and 
special investment deposits are allowed to be transformed into loans. Banks’ discretionary 
disposal of credit is consequently limited. In these models credit rationing can arise if more 
funds are demanded than available from investment deposits. This might explain why the 
majority of Islamic scholars seem to follow a fractional-reserves system. 
 
III.2. The Developmental Dimension Of Islamic Economics 
The similarity of the Islamic economic system with the Arrow-Debreu economy leads to the 
claim that Islamic finance is developmental since more investment will be undertaken than 
under financial repression — at least in a fractional-reserves framework (Dhumale and 
Sapcanin 2004). Arguably, the supply of funds will increase with the establishment of 
Islamic banks because faithful Muslims were previously reluctant to place their savings in 
interest-bearing deposits. Increased savings are in turn perceived to raise growth rates due to 
the savings-growth nexus (Chapra 2006). Yet, even in developed countries self-confessed 
Muslims often seem unaware of Islamic finance options (Dar and Presley 1999) and can 
therefore be almost certainly assumed to possess conventional bank accounts. The idea that 
rising savings automatically lead to increased investment and growth finds its origins in 
hydraulic growth models such as the Harrod-Domar one (Harrod 1939; Domar 1946). 
Despite being discredited on grounds of over-simplification and bad empirical performance 
the conviction — inherent in these models — that causality runs from savings to investment 
is still present in economic theory. Yet, as John Maynard Keynes pointed out investment 
determines savings and not the other way around (Fontana 2003).  
The existence of similarities between Islamic banking and microfinance further 
nurture the idea that the former is inherently developmental. Doubtlessly elements of 
microfinance can be considered consistent with the broader goals of Islamic banking (Ferro 
2005). Conceptually, enterprise and social welfare occupy a central role in Islamic economic 
thinking just as in microfinance (Chapra 2000a; Siddiqi 1981; Iqbal and Khan 1981; 
Grameen Bank 2008). Practically, a common feature is the absence of collateral usually 
demanded for conventional credit. Instead many microcredit lending schemes are 
                                                 
7 Mainly models based on Monzer Kahf’s work (Khan 1985). 
    8significantly based on social networks and trust, especially in traditionally organized 
communities. It is claimed that this kind of “character-based” lending is also behind Islamic 
lending (Dhumale and Sapcanin 2004). Furthermore, the fact that microfinance institutions 
like the Grameen Bank are accepted in Islamic countries such as Bangladesh is interpreted as 
evidence for the developmental character of Islamic banking (UN-HABITAT 2005). 
Whether these observations suffice to establish that Islamic banking is developmental is 
contestable, as section 4 will show. Islamic banking and microfinance definitely share the 
conviction that credit is primarily designated to finance productive investment rather than 
consumption. In this light, the discovery that borrowed funds are mainly used to satisfy 
consumption needs might be the paramount commonness.  
 
III.3. The Stability Dimension Of Islamic Economics 
Since stability is one of the main — if not the single main — preoccupations of Islamic 
economics, existing literature on the topic is extensive. This paper reviews the most salient 
Islamic arguments in light of their Western counterparts starting with microeconomic 
considerations and moving towards increasingly comprehensive macroeconomic theory of 
economic instability. 
Given the dominance of interest-based banking, some Islamic economists address the 
question whether a financial system based on PLS would be stable and could perform as well 
as an interest-based one. Since Islamic financial systems on a national level emerged only in 
the late 1970s
8 answering might have been impeded by the absence of real examples against 
which theory could be verified. Yet, M. Ali Khan and M. Nejatullah Siddiqi, using a GE 
framework, assert that Islamic finance is stable. However, according to Iqbal and Khan the 
work refuting the destabilizing possibility of ex ante undetermined credit price presented by 
their fellow Islamic economists was merely intuitively convincing while lacking the formal 
rigor of GE analysis (Iqbal and Khan 1981).  
As to the supply side of financial funds, Waqar Massod Khan, applying a 
microeconomic partial equilibrium analysis, claims to show formally that Islamic lending 
schemes are superior to non-Islamic ones. Calculating the expected utility from a variable 
rate of return (the Islamic and thus equity contract) and the expected utility from a fixed one 
(the non-Islamic and thus debt contract) the former is higher and will be preferred by the 
lender. A paradox arises because of the factual prevalence of an interest/debt-based banking 
system. Reasons are given in the form of tax deducibility — meaning governmental 
                                                 
8 In 1979 in Iran and Pakistan and in 1984 in Sudan (Khan and Mirakhor 1989; Central Bank of Sudan 2008). 
    9distortions of the price mechanism — and incentive and information based explanations 
(Khan 1985).  
Considering the demand side of financial funds, it is argued that Islamic banks are 
more run-proof than conventional ones. If the bank value declines there is supposedly less 
incentive to withdraw funds invested on a PLS base (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). 
Nonetheless, a substantial loss in funds would force the bank to withdraw already granted 
loans if it does not hold 100% reserves. Given the favorable conditions granted to 
mudharabah clients enabling them to withdraw funds on short notice
9, an already expected 
fall in profitability could cause a bank run since competing conventional banks might offer a 
higher (interest) return.  
A recent IMF working paper suggests that Islamic banks are indeed stronger than 
conventional ones but only if their assets do not exceed US$1 billion (Cihak and Hesse 
2008). As to large banks — those exceeding US$1 billion in assets — conventional ones 
prove to be more stable according to the IMF. Such a result fits neatly into the asymmetric 
information paradigm, which is acknowledged by many Islamic scholars.
10 The IMF study 
implies that small banks can operate on the principle of “character-lending” possessing a 
manageable amount of borrowers whom they can assess monitor and control effectively 
meaning collateral might be unnecessary. As the number of borrowers increases, such a 
business model, based on intense generation of information, becomes inefficient. Hence, the 
typical policy recommendation from the Bretton Woods and other institutions evolves 
around improving banking regulations in order to increase transparency.
11 The result of this 
IMF study appears to be more grounded on New Keynesian presumptions than on reliable 
facts. Methodologically, the work is more than dubious. The paper assesses bank stability 
via the so-called z-score. Using data from the commercial BankScope database it calculates 
the z-score summing up equity capital, reserves as percent of assets and the bank’s average 
return as percent of assets dividing this sum by the standard deviation of return on assets. 
The calculated ratio represents the “number of standard deviations a return realization has to 
fall in order to deplete equity” (Cihak and Hesse 2008; 7). The higher the z-score the more 
stable a bank is believed to be. The study is based on observations from 20 countries 
including 77 Islamic and 397 commercial banks for the period 1993 to 2004. Using panel 
                                                 
9 Often a notice of one month suffices (Cihak and Hesse 2008). 
10Arguably, to counter possible incentive problems Islamic banks are required to gather more information than 
conventional banks. This, however, is perceived as potential strength and comparative advantage of Islamic 
banks towards their conventional counterparts (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). 
11 See for example Sandararajan and Errico 2002 and Hassan, Shanmugan and Perumal 2005. 
    10data, observations across time and countries are treated equally.
12 This methodology is even 
more problematic since the term “bank” appears to be understood generically. But countries 
with different regional and developmental backgrounds as those making up the sample are 
very likely to define banks differently. Furthermore, in the case of Islamic banking the 
problem of fungibility occurs. Islamic banks in mixed financial systems such as in Malaysia 
are in some cases subsidiaries of conventional banks. Hence, their profitability is hard to 
measure independent of the conventional bank’s profit since funds are likely to be 
transferred between the holding company and the subsidiary. Although such a practice is 
usually forbidden under legislation regulating Islamic banking, the problem is undeniable 
when Islamic banks do not even possess separate balance sheets from their mother 
companies. Consequently, the regression undertaken by Martin Cihak and Heiko Hesse is 
questionable, which seems to be reflected in the results since the z-scores calculated were 
statistically significant in a sample of large Islamic banks only (Cihak and Hesse 2008). This 
did not stop the authors drawing conclusions from the statistically insignificant and 
methodologically questionable study. 
As to the macroeconomic perspective, W. M. Khan considers the work of a wide 
range of Western economists to support his microeconomic case against interest and the 
inherently unstable fractional-reserve banking system, most prominently Friedrich A. von 
Hayek and Milton Friedman (Khan 1985).
 13 It is peculiar that Khan refers to such distinctly 
different theoretical approaches. It explains, however, why he does not elaborate on them. 
While Friedman
14 advocated a 100%-reserves system for commercial banks (Friedman 
1959) but was generally convinced that exogenous shocks — and not interest rate changes 
— altering the quantity of money in the economy contributed substantially towards 
economic disturbances, Hayek presented a more elaborated theory of the trade cycle. For 
him the idea that the disturbing influence of money only emerges with changes in the price 
level — as pronounced by Knut Wicksell — was extremely naive (Hayek 1929). PLS 
financing modes could indeed eliminate disturbances in Wicksell’s economic theory since 
                                                 
12 On the one hand, the sample contains high-income countries such as the United Arab Emirates and on the 
other hand, least developed countries such as Gambia and Mauritania. Countries with a completely Islamized 
financial system such as Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan are present together with countries like Malaysia where 
Islamic banking exists alongside conventional banks. 
13 Henry C. Simons – who had an important influence on Hyman Minsky – is also cited by W. M. Khan. 
Simons advocated the abolition of fractional—reserve banking in order to prevent economic and social chaos 
since he regarded a discretionary management of currencies by state authorities as dangerous rulelessness 
(Simons 1934). 
14 Friedman can be regarded to write in a Wicksellian tradition starting from an equilibrium position and 
considering changes in the quantity of money. But contrary to Wicksell, Friedman did not attribute any 
importance to the rate of interest. 
    11the disturbing influence emanates from the misalignment of interest charged by banks and 
the marginal productivity of capital (Wicksell 1907). If interest — as in PLS arrangements 
— is paid in the form of a share of the actual profit, the real rate and the money rate of 
interest would always be equal. Economic fluctuations à la Wicksell would be substantially 
smaller under PLS finance because the equivalent of the money rate of interest would always 
adjust to the marginal return on capital.  
Nonetheless, Wicksell’s analysis did not concentrate on the actual source of the trade 
cycle focusing on interest instead of money and credit creation. According to Hayek, the 
reason for the shortcomings in Wicksell’s work lies in the marginalist methodology applied 
regarding the interest rate as the price equilibrating supply of savings and demand for credit 
— the loanable funds theory (Hayek 1929). In reality, growing economies can be observed 
to possess interest rates below those equilibrating demand and supply of funds since the 
former exceeds the latter. Credit is created above the level of savings supplied. Economic 
up- and downswings are due to misalignments between the equilibrium rate and the money 
rate of interest caused by changes in the volume of effective money present in the economy. 
However, credit expansion and subsequent contraction is understood as endogenous to the 
financial system and cannot be remedied (Hayek 1929). 
In contrast to Khan, Hayek did not advocate the elimination of credit. Without credit 
businesses are completely exposed to the destabilizing effects of the household saving 
leakage. Therefore, Islamic scholars, in their majority, advocate fractional-reserve banking 
put forward by Siddiqi, Uzair and Ahmed (Siddiqi 1983; Khan 1985).
15  
                                                 
15 Based on Monzer Kahf and others some Islamic economists such as Masudul Alam Choudhury and 
Mohammad Ziaul Hoque advocate 100%—reserve banking until today (Choudhury and Hogue 2004). The 
authors assume that stabilization in the fractional—reserve system is undertaken by the central bank using the 
reserve ratio. Furthermore, reserves are positively correlated with interest rates “in that as the savings increase 
with higher interest rate the central bank reserve increases by the amount of the new deposits“ (Choudhury and 
Haque 2004; 166). Monetary policy attempting to stabilize the economy can be pursued via an increase in the 
interest rate and/ or the reserve ratio. Using both channels will lead to monetary contraction. The quantity of 
money — and its difference — is assumed to be positively related to the demand for investment or spending — 
and their differences — and negatively to the reserve ratio. Hence, the attempt to increase reserves via a rise in 
interest rates will in fact affect reserves adversely due to monetary contraction.  
Such an understanding of the economy is highly hydraulic trying to establish automatic causalities 
from savings to investment. The financial system is reduced to the central bank whose policy options are 
limited to changes in reserve ratios and interest rates. Financial institutions, such as commercial banks whose 
reserves and willingness to engage in the interbank market determines the degree of liquidity present in an 
economy, are left out completely. Applying methodological individualism and reducing the financial system to 
a central bank with tightly circumscribed financial options Choudhury and Hoque follow the present consensus 
on monetary policy expressed by Michael Woodford in his “Interest and Prices” (Woodford 2003). However in 
Woodford’s model, the main policy instrument of central banks is the setting of the interest rate. Hence, some 
economists perceive the abolition of interest to weaken monetary policy (Iqbal and Mirakhor 1987). 
Econometric analysis by M. M. Metwalli (Metwalli 1989) shows that interest rate manipulation is impotent as a 
policy tool. The question why changes in reserve ratio requirements should be a more potent policy — 
especially since in their understanding the ratio would have to remain unchanged at 100% – remains open.  
    12The latter, Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad, took up Keynes’s concept of the marginal efficiency of 
capital to explain why interest rates destabilize the economy and cause cycles of booms and 
busts (Ahmad 1952). Keynes recognized that the money rate of interest impedes investment, 
production, and full employment.
16 Yet according to Ahmad, Keynes failed to draw the 
decisive conclusion that could eliminate economic crisis: the abolition of interest. This is 
because Keynes understood interest as inherent to every commodity not only money. It is 
composed of the output an asset produces minus its carrying cost and plus its liquidity 
premium, the amount of money individuals are willing to pay for the convenience to possess 
the commodity. Money is a unique commodity since it is the only one for which the liquidity 
premium exceeds the carrying cost by definition. Therefore, the money rate of interest is the 
determinant rate of interest (Keynes 1936).
17 Replacing interest entirely by PLS would mean 
that return on money did not include the liquidity premium. This would under certain 
conditions — as in a liquidity trap — either deter agents to put funds into Islamic investment 
accounts since they would lose liquidity or transfer the liquidity premium from demand 
deposit holders to the Islamic bank.  
Ahmad’s proposition is supported by Muhammad Akram Khan and Sayyid Abdul 
A’la Mawdudi’s ideas. It is argued that depression and stagnation occur because interest rate 
payments introduce an imbalance between production and consumption. Wealth and 
purchasing power are transferred from the debtor to the creditor. By definition the former 
has a higher propensity to consume. Hence, while demand for consumption goods decreases, 
since the debtor has to serve interest payments on the debt, supply increases as the creditor is 
assumed to invest the funds obtained into production. In the case of entrepreneurial credit, 
debt servicing causes prices for consumption goods to rise, which again transfers funds from 
those with a relatively high propensity to consume to those with a relatively low one (Khan 
1968; Siddiqi 1981). Evidently, this analysis introduces consideration about the income 
distribution within society showing that high income inequality can be destabilizing. 
Ahmad’s work explicitly refers to John A. Hobson and Thorstein Veblen (Ahmad 1952). 
However, while Hobson identified high income inequality levels favorable to speculation 
and the emergence of a rentier class living of unearned profit (Hobson 1938) — Veblen’s 
“Captains of Industry” (Veblen 1904) — as economically destabilizing, according to Ahmad 
                                                 
16 “The money rate of interest by setting the pace for all the other commodity rates of interest, holds back 
investment in the production of these other commodities without being capable of stimulating investment for 
the production of money, which by hypothesis cannot be produced“ (Keynes 1936; 235).  
17 “There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same thing and to have a 
green cheese factory (i.e. central bank) under public control” (Keynes 1936; 235).  
 
    13the sheer existence of interest is destabilizing. It encourages unproductive and speculative 
activity making capital for productive undertakings consequently scarce. Interest is seen to 
play a role in bringing about economic crisis. During a boom period credit expansion takes 
place and due to interest payments the marginal cost of production increases. Profit rises 
and, while wages stagnate, productive and speculative investment increases raising capital 
demand for both kinds of investment. Increased capital demand in turn pushes interest rates 
upwards, squeezing profit margins. Over-confidence is understood to cause over-production. 
Recognizing that more production is financed than the volume that promises returns, the 
central bank increases interest rates. Commercial banks follow with a raise in interest rates 
and furthermore, try to withdraw loans. Confidence falls and consumption is postponed 
exacerbating the economic downturn (Ahmad 1952).  
Yet, it is unclear what the systemic causalities behind booms and busts are. 
Mohamed Ariff sums up accurately stating that none of the Islamic scholars “really 
succeeded in establishing a causal link between interest, on the one hand, and employment 
and trade cycles, on the other (Ariff 1988; 50).  
Since interest rates influence the debt servicing for a given project and consequently 
its costs, the mere existence of debt in the form of interest is perceived to be destabilizing 
(Chapra 2000a). Hence, Islamic banking arguably eliminates a source of volatility through 
PLS since financial commitments are undertaken on an interest-free and long-term basis 
aligning financial obligations and accrual of profit (Siddiqi 2000, 2002).  
It can be at least doubted whether a PLS-based credit system will be more stable than 
a debt-based system particularly because debt proves to possess stabilizing influence on the 
financial system. In a situation of overcapitalization, a steady inflow of funds into stock and 
real estate markets can inflate those markets increasing the fragility of the economic system 
as a whole (see section 4). Debt obligations can merely inflate to a limited extent since they 
are characterized by a maturity span and an underlying fixed value (Toporowski 2000). 
Assets, in contrast, can inflate substantially. In the case of Islamic banking (and PLS 
arrangements) this inflation is especially destabilizing since investment deposit holders 
exercise control over their funds invested also bearing the investment risk usually absorbed 
by banks. If excepted Islamic return is low, investors can withdraw their funds on relatively 
short notice. This means inflation of asset markets is stopped abruptly and reversed into 
deflation. In times of crisis, an ad hoc switch to non-Islamic investment can cause a greater 
fall in asset prices causing even greater losses for those investors who do not withdraw 
deposited funds.  
    14   Generally, Islamic economic thought seems to differ significantly from Western 
thought merely on one aspect: the homo Islamicus maximizing his profit in a moral way 
compliant with the Qur’an. Despite the great repertoire of Islamic analysis concerning 
economic stability the methodology applied does not differ fundamentally from Western 
economics.
18 A mere reduction to individual choice and a focus on trust and its betrayal — 
also characteristic of the New Keynesian approach — cannot provide a comprehensive 
theory of the workings of the economy. Nonetheless, a comprehensive theory is essential in 
identifying factors destabilizing to the system. Islamic economics contributes little original 
thought towards the question of economic stability and mainly borrow from Western 
economic theory since economic and financial instability are phenomena of Western 
economies rather than the societies from which the doctrine of Islamic banking emerged. 
Those borrowed concepts are often absorbed superficially resulting in the intuitive claim of a 
superior Islamic alternative.  
Typically Islamic banking does not exist in isolation from conventional finance. It is 
crucial to place Islamic finance in the context of domestic and global economic and financial 
flows dominated by non-Islamic finance. Minsky’s methodology (Minsky 1986) and its 
developments by Toporowski (2000) offer a systemic way to analyze financial sector 
dynamics examining the flow of funds. This makes it superior to New Keynesian approaches 
based on restrictive assumptions about markets subject to information, moral sentiments, or 
data manipulation.  
 
                                                 
18 This claim can be reinforced by pointing toward the vast literature produced by economists, sociologists and 
political economists on bounded rationality and collective action, which allow for individual motivations other 
than the exclusively selfish, materialistic ones of the homo economicus (Weber 1969, Elster 1989). Hence, the 
assumption of a morally guided individual can be hardly claimed as unique to Islamic economics. 
 
    15IV. ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA FROM A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE  
 
In an open economy without government activity the saving identity takes the following 
shape (Steindl 1989, Toporowski 2008): 
 
S ≡ SH + S F ≡ I + (X — M)         (1) 
 
where  S  = total saving, 
 S F = retained profits of firms, 
  I   = gross investment 
  (X — M) = trade surplus.   
 
Thus, retained profits are composed of the sum of investment and the foreign balance minus 
household saving: 
 
SF = I + (X — M) — SH       ( 2 )  
 
In an economy which possesses a structurally positive foreign balance due to the 
dominance of export-oriented corporations such as in Malaysia the saving leakage is less 
likely to induce “enforced indebtedness” (Steindl 1989) because it is off-set by a balance of 
payments surplus.
19  
In the international setting the surplus of one country constitutes the deficit of 
another one as Steindl points out (Steindl 1989). The case of emerging markets is interesting 
since many of them — particularly China, India and Southeast Asia — are accumulating vast 
balance of payments surpluses. But these surpluses are typically held in US$ or US-treasury 
bonds. Hence, although emerging markets seem powerful in exporting commodities or 
(relatively low-skill) manufactured goods, it is the developed world that dominates the 
international financial architecture. Simultaneously, financialization is the most advanced 
aspect of globalization
20. Thus, emerging markets face international financial institutions 
                                                 
19 If (X – M) is positive, retained profits (SF) increase. In corporations listed on the stock exchange this means 
that firm’s assets and its liabilities to the shareholders grow. Since shareholders are mainly interested in selling 
shares at a higher price it is logical that their main focus lies on the firm’s balance sheet, which is commonly 
regarded as indicator of its profitability. Increased liabilities to the shareholders will bring the firm under 
pressure to constantly improve its balance sheet. As productive investment only generates income in the long 
run, financial operations are more suitable to meet expectations of increased profitability. Hence, a structural 
balance of payments surplus might favor the accumulation of further excess capital. 
20 Globalization refers in economic terms to the increase in and liberalization of international factor movements 
— i.e. finance, trade, and migration. 
    16that are determined by the financially advanced countries and are to a big extent forced to 
copy those institutions in the course of financial catching-up. In this context, Islamic banking 
is an interesting phenomenon since it explicitly tries to break with the Western financial 
dominance banning interest. The question is whether the autonomous development of this 
market segment — for a long time regarded as niche market — is possible. The answer 
might differ for financially isolated countries such as Iran and internationally integrated ones 
such as Malaysia. This paper reviews the latter case.  
The role banks, and more specifically Islamic banks, play in the modern setting 
highly depends on the purpose of their activity. It can no longer be assumed that funds 
simply flow from households to firms since households engage in investment activities and 
firms hoard funds in the form of excess capital. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the 
origin and direction of bank lending to assess its overall impact on economic stability.  
Islamic banking in Malaysia exposes key economic and financial issues in Islamic 
banking. Malaysia possesses a comprehensive Islamic banking and financial system 
including an Islamic capital market, insurance companies, savings and developmental 
finance institutions. Simultaneously, non-Islamic companies are allowed to offer Islamic 
products. Furthermore, Malaysia is an export- and foreign direct investment (FDI)-oriented 
country and therefore strives to ensure openness towards the international economic and 
financial system. Consequently, Malaysia’s domestic and international conditions make the 
country a paradigm of the effects that Islamic banking and international finance exert on 
each other. Hence, although this study focuses on the significance of Islamic banking for 
Malaysian economic stability it can be taken as an indicator of the role Islamic banking will 
play in international finance once it leaves its niche. 
Malaysia possesses a structural current account surplus as is shown in table 4.1. This 
surplus grew constantly during the last 10 years from RM36.8 billion in 1998 to RM91 
billion and an estimated RM93 billion in 2007. Admittedly, the years 2000, 2001, and 2002 
are exceptions when the surplus fell to around RM30 billion. Nonetheless, with a GDP of 
RM642 billion in 2007 the estimated surplus accounts for an impressive 14.5% of GDP 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia 2008). Malaysia’s international trade position is 
determined by its large commodity exports — particularly rubber, palm oil and forestry 
products — which in turn are a legacy of fertile land and the colonial past. Remarkably, the 
private sector holds at least two thirds of the foreign surplus. In 2005 and 2006, private 
corporations and households together actually received 86.2% and 77.8% of the non-
financial balance surplus.  
    17 





    19As equations (1) and (2) show a positive foreign deficit can result in domestic firms’ 
overcapitalization. Nevertheless, households may be the main beneficiaries of the surplus 
instead of companies. In order to shed light on the question whether Malaysian firms are 
overcapitalized the balance sheets of a representative sample of large Malaysian companies 
will be examined. Since large non-financial companies typically undertake the bulk of fixed 
capital investment and not SMEs the 25 companies holding the largest stocks at the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) by market value are considered (Bloomberg 2008). Public 
Bank, Malayan Banking, Bumiputra Commerce Holding, RHB Capital, AMMB Holdings, 
and Hong Leong Bank being financial companies are excluded from the list. Furthermore, 
Genting Group, PETRONAS, and YTL Corporation all figure twice in the list due to their 
subsidiary structure. Only the group as a whole will be considered. From the remaining 
sample of 16 firms 14 publish financial statements with annual reports on their websites. 
UMW Holdings — number 25 in the list of largest stocks by market value — is excluded 
since the firm’s financial statements are available only for one year.  
For the 13 companies assets and liabilities are considered. Excess capital is typically 
held in marketable securities and short-term investment but also as deposits, cash 
equivalents, and bank and cash balances. Table 4.2 shows total assets (1.) and total liabilities 
(2.) — which are equal by definition — as well as banking and financial assets (3.) of the 
representative firms. The most interesting parameter for this paper’s purpose is, however, the 
calculated percentage of banking and financial assets as share of total liabilities (4.). In 
marginalist theory companies hold liquid assets only to the extent that marginal revenue 
covers marginal cost of capital. This implicitly assumes that banks mainly generate profit via 
the interest rate spread that exists between the interest rate paid on deposits (borrowing) and 
that received from credit servicing by firms (lending). Liability management by companies 
(and banks) leading to speculative return on liquid assets — deriving from the increase in 
value of financial assets — is excluded (Toporowski, 2008). Hence, in the marginalist 
worldview it is costly for firms to hold banking and financial assets. The only reason to do 
so is to meet unexpected needs of the production process.  
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    28As chart 4.1 demonstrates some Malaysian firms hold a significant share of their 
liabilities in financial and banking assets. Particularly striking is the high level of liquid 
financial assets that the Malaysia-based multinational PETRONAS possesses, namely 
between 35% and 45% of its total liabilities for the period 2000 to 2008. Also the Genting 
Group holds constantly (with the exception of 2000) more than 20% of its total liabilities in 
different kinds of short-term investment and cash (equivalents) for 2000 to 2007.  
 
Chart 4.1: Financial Accumulation of the Largest Malaysian Firms Listed at KLSE (as 
% of Total Liabilities Held as Financial Assets, 1998-2008) 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports of Sime Darby Berhad, IOI Corporation, Tenaga Nasional Berhad, MISC Berhad, 
Genting Group, PETRONAS, DiGi Telecommunication, Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad, PLUS Expressway 
Berhad, PPB Group Berhad, YTL Corporation Berhad, Telekom Malaysia, MMC Corporation Berhad, various 
years. 
   
On average, the sample of Malaysian companies holds an increasing share of liabilities in 
banking and financial assets as chart 4.2 reveals. This trend is even more apparent if the first 
observation (1998) and the last one (2008) are excluded. Since in both cases the average is 
based on one firm, Genting Group and PETRONAS respectively, this exclusion is advisable. 
From 1999 to 2007 the average percentage of liabilities held as types of short-term 
investment and cash (equivalents) grew from 10.87% to 28.95%.
21  
                                                 
21 Evidently, the data presented — as all data — is prone to error. In many cases companies restate their 
balance sheets in corrected form in subsequent annual reports. If such corrections were implemented the 
restated figures are used for the present calculations. In big conglomerates which are company groups 
composed of a number of subsidiaries owned by a holding company the occurrence of incorrect data is even 
more likely since mistakes are added up while putting together the group’s financial statement. Furthermore, 
balance sheets face problems additional to those data collection in general is experiencing. By definition assets 
and liabilities have to match. Deviations are often arbitrarily eliminated which can be suspected to have an 
adverse effect on the presented data. However, the increasing trend of Malaysian companies to hold financial 
    29Chart 4.2: Average Financial Accumulation of the Largest Malaysian Firms Listed at 
KLSE (as % of Total Liabilities Held as Financial Assets, 1998-2008) 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports of Sime Darby Berhad, IOI Corporation, Tenaga Nasional Berhad, MISC Berhad, 
Genting Group, PETRONAS, DiGi Telecommunication, Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad, PLUS Expressway 
Berhad, PPB Group Berhad, YTL Corporation Berhad, Telekom Malaysia, MMC Corporation Berhad, various 
years. 
 
If Malaysian companies are overcapitalized the question arises what role banking — 
traditionally believed to supply undercapitalized firms with loanable funds — fulfils in the 
economic system. This paper argues that the effects of financialization — particularly the 
inversion of the direction (thus, the change in the origin) of loanable funds — is not merely a 
characteristic of certain developed economies (as argued in Toporowski 2008) but equally 
arises in emerging markets. The large unmet demand of individuals for durable consumption 
goods and housing enables households to take on the role of the investing sector in the 
overall economy. Yet, this is only possible if the corporate sector shows signs of 
overcapitalization and relinquishes this role to households. Excess capital puts firms in a 
position where they can acquire a source of profit alternative to commercial and industrial 
activity. While the emergence of excess capital in the OECD world is often linked to 
monopolistic (and oligopolistic) profits a structural current account surplus is likely to be at 
the origins in emerging markets. As frequently pointed out such a combination of balance of 
payments surplus and unmet demand favors volatile commodity markets (The Economist 
                                                                                                                                                       
and banking assets is not only supported by individual firms’ balance sheets but also by the above considered 
current account figures.  
    302007). Hence, bank credit especially if used by households to invest in real estate or 
purchases of securities destabilizes the economic system.  
Despite its claim to affect the economic system in a stabilizing way promoting 
productive investment, Islamic banks in Malaysia channel funds from the corporate to the 
household sector financing mainly vehicle and residential property purchases.  
According to BNM, there are 12 full-fledged Islamic banks active (Bank Negara 
Malaysia 2008). However, two of them being subsidiaries wholly owned by conventional 
banks — AmIslamic Bank Berhad incorporated in May 2006, wholly owned by AmBank 
Malaysia and CIMB Islamic Bank incorporated in January 2003, wholly owned by CIMB 
Bank — do not possess a separate balance sheet. Evidently, in financial systems where 
conventional and Islamic banking coexist alongside each other as in Malaysia it is 
questionable whether one type can isolate itself from certain features of the other. This 
coexistence is more likely to take the shape of interdependence as the incorporation of 
Islamic banks into conventional ones suggests. Fungibility issues blur the lines between 
Islamic and non-Islamic operations within the economy.  
Reviewing the liability side of the ten Islamic banks with individual balance sheets 
for 2007, deposits of non-financial companies constitute a higher share in total liabilities 
than deposits of individuals (table 4.3). In 2007, the range of non-financial companies’ 
deposits as share of total liabilities in the sample is huge starting with as little as 11.20% for 
Affin Islamic Bank and going up to as much as 92.10% for Al Rajhi Banking and Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia). As to deposits of individuals as share of total liabilities for 2007 the 
percentage tends to be much smaller.  
Individual deposits account for only 0.26% of liabilities of Kuwait Finance House 
Malaysia and for 22.03% in Hong Leong Bank constituting the lower and the upper end of 
the range, respectively. All four banks were incorporated relatively recently; Al Rajhi 
Banking in 2006 and all others in 2005. Out of the group of 12, only three banks started 
operations before 2005. Bank Islam Malaysia (BIMB) was founded in 1983, Bank Muamalat 
Malaysia in 1999 and the already mentioned CIMB Islamic Bank in 2003. Since the last one 
does not provide a separate balance sheet BIMB and Bank Muamalat are more interesting as 
to detecting trends in Islamic banking liabilities.  
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Source: Annual Reports of Affin Islamic Bank Bhd, Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) 
Bhd, Asian Finance Bank Bhd, Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd, Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd, EONCAP Islamic 
Bank Bhd, Hong Leong Islamic Bank Bhd, Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd, Maybank Islamic Bhd, 
RHB ISLAMIC Bank Bhd, various issues.  
    43BIMB was the first Malaysian Islamic bank. Available data about the composition of total 
liabilities goes back to 1993. Initially, the bank mainly drew on deposits of individuals to 
finance its lending. Hence, household saving in fact constituted 43.75% of total liabilities in 
1993 while non-financial companies only contributed 16.68% to the bank’s liabilities (table 
4.3). “Others” deposited the residual. This category is likely to include institutional 
investors, which are highly developed in Malaysia.
22  
As to the composition of liabilities for BIMB it is noteworthy that until 1997 
individual deposits constituted a share more than twice as big as company deposits. In 1998 
and 1999 liabilities to households still exceeded those to companies. Yet the non-financial 
corporate sector increased their deposits with BIMB substantially from RM828 billion to 
RM1164 billion accounting for 19.56% of bank liabilities in 1997 and 29.27% in 1998. This 
surge in banking assets held by companies might be a precaution taken due to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98. The interesting fact is that firms did not withdraw their money 
from BIMB in subsequent years. On the contrary, corporate deposits kept growing 
overtaking individual deposits as share in bank liabilities by 2000. From 2001 to 2007, non-
financial enterprise contributed more than twice the amount of money to BIMB’s liabilities 
than households. 2008 suggests that contributions by the two groups converge towards a 
share somewhere around 25%. Yet data for 2008 is derived from the latest Quarterly Report 
and is, due to its preliminary character, less reliable. Financial statements available for the 
second Islamic bank founded in Malaysia, Muamalat Bank Malaysia, support the evidence 
that on the liability side non-financial companies are the major depositors of Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. The figures available cover the period 2003 to 2008. While individuals 
contribute less than 10% and a decreasing share of bank liabilities, companies’ deposits 
amount to 36% of liabilities in 2003 overall increasing to 42.58% in the first quarter of 2008.  
These results also reflect the trends in most of the more recently established Islamic 
banks in Malaysia. With the exception of Maybank Islamic and BIMB before 2000, non-
financial enterprises contribute significantly more to bank liabilities than households. For the 
period 2000 to 2008, enterprises’ percentage share is typically 30% or more. Here, Affin 
Islamic Bank can be seen as exception. The share in question is 18.59% in 2008. However, 
the share of individual deposits in total liabilities also only amounts to 4.43%. 
                                                 
22 Among them the employees’ pension fund (EPF) managing the retirement savings of the majority of the 
population became an important investor as the requirement to hold funds in government securities was 
gradually relaxed since the mid-1980s (Suto 2001). 
    44On the assets side, out of the ten banks examined only Asian Finance Bank and 
Kuwait Finance House focus their lending activity completely on non-financial companies.
23 
Both banks channel more than 70% of their loans into the corporate sector lending less than 
3% of their assets to individuals. Al Rajhi Banking, RHB Islamic Bank and Mualamat Bank 
Malaysia all provide approximately the same share of their assets as credit to households as 
to companies. The remaining five Islamic banks provide a significantly larger share of total 
loans to individuals than to non-financial companies. Hence, there is convincing evidence 
that funds flow in fact from companies to households and not the other way around (table 
4.3).  
Since there is little data available for the years before the Asian financial crisis firms’ 
overcapitalization could admittedly be a cyclical phenomenon arising as precautionary 
measure after periods of economic distress. The effect on the housing market — or other 
markets where the surplus funds are channeled to — remains nonetheless the same. If 
anything, overcapitalization as cyclical phenomenon can only increase economic instability 
since a slowdown in the flow of funds into an inflated market makes prices stagnate and 
triggers a downward price spiral. 
Analyzing the purpose of credit granted the purchase of transport vehicles and 
residential property figure most prominently for all Islamic banks with the exception of 
Asian Finance Bank, Kuwait Finance House and Al Rajhi Banking. This observation is in 
accordance with data collected by BNM on the direction of Islamic lending in Malaysia 
(chart 4.3). Since 1996, the sum of Islamic credit for purchase of residential property and 
consumption rose from 24.3% to 59.9% in 2005. Especially, consumption credit increased 
steadily while loans for property purchases experienced a less steady upward trend. Since 
2000, BNM disaggregates consumption credit demonstrating that the major part of it is used 
for the purchase of transport vehicles confirming the results found analyzing individual bank 










                                                 
23 Both banks are owned by Middle Eastern investors and are therefore likely to concentrate on Middle Eastern 
companies operating in Malaysia. 
    45Chart 4.3: Islamic Lending for Residential Property and Consumption as % of Total 
Credit to the Private Sector, 1996-2005 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports, Bank Negara Malaysia, various issues. 
 
Table 4.4: Direction of Islamic Lending in Malaysia as % of Total Lending, 2000-2005  
 
Year  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Sector 
Real Estate  1.70%  2.00% 1.82% 1.67% 1.57% 1.44% 
Construction  7.50% 6.00% 6.20% 6.03% 6.10% 4.95% 
Purchase of Residential Property  19.00%  24.30%  29.31%  29.51%  26.66%  23.71% 
Purchase of Non-Residential Property  7.60%  5.90%  5.52%  4.92%  4.46% 3.93% 
Consumption Credit 19.40%  24.20%  25.29% 30.59% 30.76% 36.19% 
of  which        
Purchase of Consumer Durables  0.20%  0.20%  0.17%  0.11%  0.08%  0.06% 
Purchase of Transport Vehicles  17.50%  21.50%  22.07%  26.79%  25.91%  29.89% 
        
Total Credit to Private Sector (in RMmillion)  20,891  28,201  36,718  48,615  57,883  67,365 
Source: Annual Reports, Bank Negara Malaysia, various issues. 
 
 
    46Comparing the directions of lending for Islamic credit with those for overall credit in the 
Malaysian economy, it is striking that overall almost 30% of granted loans are used for 
investment in corporate securities (table 4.5) while most Islamic banks — with the exception 
of Al Rajhi Banking — lend a rather negligible share of total loans for security purchases. 
This can be, however, explained with the relative novelty of the Islamic capital market and 
Islamic corporate bonds in Malaysia. Hence, it can be expected that lending directions of 
Islamic banks will account for the new possibility to invest in Islamic securities and change, 
maybe through the emergence of banking companies such as Al Rajhi Banking focusing on 
this market segment.  
Thus, the evidence suggests the initial hypothesis that Islamic banks in Malaysia 
channel funds from the overcapitalized non-financial corporate sector towards households 
investing into housing and durable consumer goods is valid. However, if this is the case 
Islamic banks — just as conventional ones — are far from exercising a stabilizing effect on 
the economic system. Housing markets inflate in a comparable way to capital markets 
especially if the buy-to-let mechanism is prevalent. Prices are determined by the inflow of 
liquidity. Price changes — if positive — tend to attract further inflow of funds as investors 
hope that the increase in value will continue. Dynamics work similarly in the opposite 
direction. If the household sector is unwilling to increase its borrowing for house purchase 
prices stop rising which might have a deflating effect. New investors stay away while current 
ones try to sell at a relatively favorable price destabilizing the housing market.  
A secondary result of this study is the realization that the dominance of Western 
financial and economic patterns is paramount. Particularly a niche phenomenon such as 
Islamic banking which put a lot of effort into isolating itself from debt-based banking and its 
destabilizing impact should be able to shield itself from Western post-modern, financialized 
institutions. Yet, this is not the case. Inter-dependence is a characteristic of all elements that 
open up to the world economy and total isolation might not even be possible without total 
backwardness. The companies that are putting deposits into Islamic banks are earning their 
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    48V. CONCLUSION 
 
Both mainstream Western economic theory and Islamic economists fail to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the economy explaining the role of banking. This lack of a 
systematic understanding of financial intermediation in New Keynesian and Islamic models 
means that neither theory convincingly explains financial dynamics. A flow of funds 
analysis reveals that (at least) since 1998 a current account surplus has been steadily 
channeled into the Malaysian economy resulting in the overcapitalization of domestic firms 
and the emergence of a financial business cycle. Contrary to the claims of Islamic scholars, 
Islamic banks channeling funds from companies to households play a destabilizing role in 
the economy as a whole. Credit granted to the household sector is used for housing 
purchases and therefore inflates this asset market, increasing the system’s economic fragility 
and encouraging speculation. These trends, affecting the economy as a whole, are reflected 
by the Islamic banks’ balance sheets.  
Through financial inflation and overcapitalization, banking in emerging markets, in 
general and Malaysian Islamic banking in particular, are reproducing those features that give 
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